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Using principles of nance, we control for outside transportation rates and commodity market
shocks, previously omitted variables, into Porter's (1983) analysis of industry demand, stability and
pricing in the Joint Executive Committee Railroad Cartel. Our estimates of demand primitives are
greatly enhanced by having cross-price eects. Finite periods of Cartel instability, as dened in
the Aldrich Report (1893), are found to be triggered by unexpected commodity market shocks, and
not by demand cycles, controlling for other factors. This is consistent with previous literature. We
model pricing over marginal costs as a nonparametric function of a set of factors, including expec-
tations of deterministic demand cycles and the expected probability of cartel stability. We estimate
this nonparametric function, and linear marginal costs semiparametrically, as part of an equilibrium
price path. Our estimated mark-up cycles during periods of stability, indicate that the JEC set rates
over expected demand cycles as modeled in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991).
Keywords: Demand shocks in New York, Deterministic demand cycles, Elevators in-
ventory management, JEC Railroad Cartel, Outside transportation rates, Spot and
future weekly commodity prices in Chicago and New York, Structural modeling.
JEL classiers: L92, L10.
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11 Introduction
The Joint Executive Committee Railroad Cartel (JEC) was in operation before the formation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) and the passing of the Sherman Act (1890). The Committee
operated explicitly as a legal Railroad Cartel during the period 1880 to 1886. A key issue for this paper,
and most of the literature that worked on the JEC, is understanding how the Cartel sustained itself over
deterministic cycles and in the presence of unexpected demand shocks, amongst other factors. To do this
we incorporate previously omitted controls for expected outside transportation options and commodity
market shocks into Porter's (1983) \henceforth Porter" analysis of market demand, pricing and stability
in the JEC Cartel.
Raw data from Coleman (2009) allow us to model the average weekly cost of moving grain (corn)
between Chicago and New York. Coleman makes use of a theory based on the law of one price that allows
for storage management and slow transportation over the Great Lakes (Lakes) to document how taking
dierences in the weekly spot price of corn in Chicago and the one month future in New York controls
for the true expected shadow price of moving grain between the two cities. Lakes and Canals were the
dominant mode of grain transportation between Chicago and New York, and Elevators played a key role
in the demand for transportation. Elevators in New York did not accept high Winter transport costs, but
rather used inventories to benet from the low transportation costs in the open season. Transportation
over the Lakes and Canals took three weeks and any shortfalls in New York (mainly for export), could
be made up for, over Rail, in a few days. Even though the Lakes are closed for the Winter season,
Coleman provides convincing empirical evidence that dierences in the weekly price for corn in Chicago
and New York stock markets mainly re
ected the transportation costs of corn over the Lakes and Canals
plus storage costs. Commodity prices in Chicago and New York stock markets, spots and futures, are
independent of transportation prices and volumes set by the JEC cartel. Inventory management ensured
the JEC potentially faced competition from the Lakes and Canals all year round. In this way inventory
and pricing on the Lakes and Canals route imposed exogenous but, as we will document, predictable
changes in demand on the JEC Railroad Cartel.
With simple extensions of the model in Porter, and with data on the expected rate of outside
transportation options, we estimate improved demand primitives for the JEC, which are important to
recover mark-ups from pricing. In addition, in terms of optimal price setting we illustrate how the
JEC rate movements over marginal cost were driven by deterministic cycles, among other factors, to
maintain Cartel stability. Hence, we also allow the mark-up to be driven by the expected rate of outside
transportation options, amongst other factors.
This new data allows us to control for previously omitted data, but also to model and estimate
demand, pricing and Cartel stability in an innovative way. Our modeling leads to rich estimates of
weekly mark-up dynamics that were not previously estimated and documented for this Cartel. The
price-cost margin from a generalized rst order condition for pricing in an imperfectly competitive







Weekly price-cost margins can be expressed as the ratio of a conduct parameter, t, and the total
industry elasticity of demand . We depart from the previous literature on the JEC in two important
ways. First, we allow the JEC overall elasticity of demand, , to be made up of two demand primitives,
the own- and cross-price elasticity of demand. Demand will be found to depend on the expected price of
2outside transportation options, among other things. Secondly, we model conduct, t, as a nonparametric
function of a set of observable variables.1 Porter provides us with evidence that the JEC did experience
nite periods of revisions to low mark-ups to sustain the Cartel, as modeled in Green and Porter (1984).
We conrm that his estimates of such nite revision phases are very similar to the periods of Cartel
instability, as dened in the Aldrich Report (1893).
We also model the causes of Cartel instability. Following Ellison (1994) we face-o deterministic
cycles against unanticipated demand shocks as triggers of nite periods of instability, amongst other fac-
tors. Consistent with Ellison, we nd that errors in such expectations, driven by unexpected commodity
price shocks, are the key reason for the JEC spinning into nite periods of instability.2 One important
component of our modeling of t, will be the expected probability of the Cartel in the next period being
stable or not, amongst other controls. We work with precisely the same functional form for cost employed
by Porter, but similar to Appelbaum (1982) we model Porter's hidden regime (the conduct parameter)
with a set of observables entering a nonparametric function. We wish to show how the inclusion of
previously omitted data into this nonparametric function leads to richer mark-up dynamics, particularly
when the Cartel is stable.3 We include the following observables into a nonparametric modeling of what
was Porter's unobservable (the mark-up): expected price of outside transportation options; estimated
expected probability of Cartel stability; and movements in the internal incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC) generated by anticipated demand cycles and not captured by the outside transportation options
- as motivated by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). We capture the latter with a strictly exogenous
count on the number of weeks that the Lakes are open and on the number of weeks to Lakes opening.
We use these variables to proxy for expectations of increasing (decreasing) demand as we move along
the weeks in the Lakes open (closed) season. Our modeling of pricing is conditioned on the probability
of being in a stable regime in the next period and is estimated simultaneously with demand.
Overall we document a much richer and more general model of the factors driving JEC pricing above
marginal cost (mark-up). Taking this mark-up with demand primitives we test for important properties
in the dynamics of price-cost margins for this Cartel and nd support for cyclical pricing as uncovered in
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). To test the Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) theory during the
collusive periods, we regress price-cost margins during upswings and price-cost margins during down-
turns on a quartic function of the demand business cycle. The Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) theory
seems to be validated: for the same level of demand, the price (mark-up) is lower when the JEC is in a
period of prolonged decline in demand, compared with that coming into a period of prolonged increases
1Theory based on repeated games suggests that the Bresnahan's (1989)  is not static, as the intensity of price com-
petition (market share rivalry) can vary over time. The way one models demand impacts the trade-o between one shot
gains and discounted losses in incentive compatibility constraints in repeated games. This has been shown to generate very
dierent time paths of the conduct and equilibrium price-cost margin (see for example Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and Fabra (2006)). Genesove and Mullin (1998) provides us with
a nice overview of the empirical issues surrounding the estimation of the generalized rst order condition for pricing in
homogenous good industries.
2Several theoretical papers have discussed this problem within the JEC, both from traditional, and game theoretic
frameworks. The focus of this work has been on the apparent causes of \price wars" identied by Porter (1983), Ulen
(1983), Porter (1985), Ellison (1994), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), and Vasconcelos (2004). The core aim of the Ellison
paper is to try and understand plausible trigger strategies that could send the Cartel into nite periods of punishment. His
main nding is that unexpected demand shocks in the AR(1) residual of demand triggered the price war. This is tested
against a Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) eect where the ICC comes under pressure when anticipated demand is high but
low in the next period. Using data on commodity markets in New York, we intend to show that unanticipated commodity
market shocks in New York were the trigger and not the cyclical nature of pricing as controlled by us. This is compatible
with the ndings of Ellison. As in Ellison, unusual movements in the market share of companies are not found to be the
culprit. It seems that a common external unanticipated commodity shock was the trigger, consistent with the mechanisms
in the trigger strategy discussed in the Green and Porter (1984) paper.
3We provide a direct comparison of our results with Porter, and for this reason make no attempt to separate out this
function in pricing from costs using the techniques suggested in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
3in demand. We see the important role of expected demand on mark-up cycles, reiterating the ndings
in Borenstein and Shepard (1996).
To sum up, the Porter study is regarded by most as a classic IO paper and the best analysis of a func-
tioning cartel with imperfect observation. Incorporating previously omitted variables, using principles of
nance, into an analysis of demand, pricing setting and stability in the JEC Railroad Cartel, does give
us important new insights into rate setting in the JEC. While the results are broadly similar to Ellison
(1994) in terms of our modeling of stability and demand, we nd that the anticipated cyclical nature of
demand is important for mark-ups (pricing) during periods of Cartel stability. Incorporating previously
omitted variables in our modeling of mark-ups dynamics allows us to use an innovative semiparametric
approach to estimating a generalized rst order condition for pricing in an imperfectly competitive ho-
mogenous good industry. The resulting mark-up dynamics are very rich. In terms of lessons for today,
the paper suggests that illegal price co-ordination can be detected in markets where rms must price
over deterministic demand cycles.
In section two, we describe the data and literature. In section three, we replicate Porter and intro-
duce our extension. In section four we provide results. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
2 The Data and Literature
The JEC managed East-bound freight shipments of grain, 
our and provisions from Chicago to the
Atlantic Coast. Grain was by far the most important commodity for the Cartel. The JEC set ocial
rates and market share allotments, and managed clearing arrangements for those above and below their
allocated tonnage for trac out of Chicago. All members of the Cartel had full information on ocial
rates, tonnage of trac by each company and any deviation between allocated and actual tonnage.
These statistics were published in weekly reports in the Railway Review and the Chicago Tribune. Porter
employs a time series Cartel level data set, previously collated by Ulen (1979), to provide evidence of
revisions to a low mark-up by the Cartel for nite periods. This nding is consistent with how to keep a
cartel sustainable in the optimal equilibrium model of Green and Porter (1984). The top part of Table
1 provides summary statistics for the variables that he utilized. The period of reference spans from
January 1, 1880 to April 18, 1886, for a total of 328 weeks.
Ellison (1994) provides us with another important empirical paper on the JEC. Building on Porter
he imposes a Markov structure on the transitions to nite periods of low pricing to allow him model
the causes of \price wars". He estimates the parameters of the demand and pricing model of Porter by
maximizing the joint likelihood of a system of demand, pricing and paths of transitions into and out of
the Cartel instability. In addition, he imposes an AR(1) structure in the residuals of the Porter demand
function and nds evidence of hidden regimes (omitted variables) in demand. We address this issue by
bringing some key omitted variables into the demand function, most importantly the expected outside
transportation rate. The core aim of the Ellison paper was to try and understand plausible trigger
strategies that could send the Cartel into nite periods of punishment. He tested, but found little
evidence of, four triggers constructed from the rm (railroad) level data, each designated to proxy for
signals of cheating by rms inside the Cartel. Computing these variables requires having rm-level data
on assigned quotas and actual market shares. We replicate his variables for use in our empirical model
of Cartel stability. We document our reproduction in Table 1. The rst of Ellison's variables, BIG1, is











, with sit denoting
the average market share over the previous twelve weeks.4 The heteroscedastic parameter i indicates
each rm's standard deviation. Nt denotes the number of rms in the Cartel in period t. BIG2 is a
variant of BIG1, with the only dierence being that sit 
Qit
Qt . BIGQ is also a variant of BIG1, which
uses sit as dened in BIG1, but computes sit over the allotted market share ait. The last of the Ellison's
variables is SMALL1. Its role is to detect an unusually small market share for one of the rms in the
Cartel. It is calculated as the absolute value of the min
i
(sit sit)




(zero otherwise), where sit and sit are those earlier dened in BIG1.5 As in Ellison, unusual movements
in the market share of companies are not found to be the trigger. It seems that a common external
unanticipated commodity shock is the culprit.
A nal focus of Ellison was on the cyclical nature of pricing in the JEC. He nds little evidence that
the cyclical or seasonal nature of demand had any impact on the general run of pricing or on a transition
to \price wars".
We construct variables from grain commodity markets that will control for external pressures to the
JEC coming from outside transportation options and commodity market shocks in New York. Coleman
(2009) had some key insights into the functioning of the late-nineteenth century transportation of grain
between Chicago and New York. To facilitate the export of grain from the Great Plains to Europe after
harvesting, there was a major rush to get grain over the Great Lakes and Canals to New York for storage
in Elevators. The slowest and least expensive method was to travel to Bualo by ship via the Great
Lakes, and then on to New York along the Erie Canal (purposely enlarged during the period 1836 and
1862). This took approximately three weeks. A faster and more expensive method, taking ten days, was
to ship it to Bualo and then use rail on New York. This was useful particularly as the Canals would
freeze up before the ports of the Lakes. Transportation over the Great Lakes was not available between
November and late April however, as both the Canals and the ports of the Great Lakes were frozen. The
fastest and most expensive method, available all year round, was to send grain over three days by rail to
New York. The rail route could be used to top-up any shortfalls all year round. Generally, the market
tried to stock inventories using the cheap and slow (closed in winter) mode of transportation. During the
period 1878 and 1890, Coleman estimates that 95 per cent of corn that was transported in the open water
season was shipped by Lakes. From the Aldrich Report (1893) we have various alternative measures of
Lakes open/closed compared to Porter. Table 2 documents the number of weeks that Porter's Lakes (L),
and our Lakes and Railroads (LR) and Lakes and Canals (LC) remain open, for each year comprising
the 328 weeks period.6 Canals freeze before the ports of the Lakes, and hence we see longer periods
of Lakes open in the case of Lakes and Railroads. The duration of Lakes open using L, LC and LR
dummies are very similar, and for that reason in the rest of the analysis we stay loyal to Porter and
employ his Lakes dummy, L. Table 2 also describes the trend of periods of stability, measured by PO
and PR. PO is a variable that Ulen (1978) constructed on the basis of internal reports of \price wars"
within the Cartel (the variable is included in the list of Porter's variables displayed in Table 1). As in
Porter we are not fully condent in that variable, and so we propose another binary variable for periods
of collusion denoted by PR. Our PR variable is set to one when the JEC grain rate was equal to the
Chicago-New York grain rate from the Aldrich Report that Railroads, including the JEC, tried to peg
to. From the table it emerges that PO and PR are similar, but the number of disruptions to Cartel
4For the rst twelve weeks we average over any previous available week.
5In our data two observations have min
i
(sit sit)
i > 0, and thus have SMALL1 equal to zero.
6We utilize prices for shipments over Lakes and Railroads, and Lakes and Canals to recover the number of weeks that
Lakes and Railroads, and Lakes and Canals, are open.
5pricing in the JEC is not as great using the PR dummy. It turns out to be very similar to the PN
cheating binary variable estimated by Porter in his hidden regime model, as conrmed by the mean
values and standard deviations reported in Table 1. Our use of data on PR turns out to be important
in our empirical methodology. We will estimate demand and pricing simultaneously but condition the
pricing equation on the expected probability of cartel instability. Our variable PR will be modeled as a
ARMA(1,1) linear probability model.
Coleman shows that generally speaking the weekly discrepancy between a future commodity price
in New York and a spot commodity price in Chicago can be considered a good proxy for the expected
average transportation and storage costs of moving grain from Chicago to New York. This assertion
is empirically backed up using actual data on transportation rates and storage costs from the Aldrich
Report. In general the presence of inventories allowed most of the shipments of grain to benet from
the slow and cheap option of transportation over the Lakes and Canals all year round. Table 1 presents
denitions and summary statistics for a list of variables we constructed from his raw data. We dene













It is a maintained assumption that price setting on the Lakes and Canals route and inventory manage-
ment could not be in
uenced by the Railroad Cartel, but pricing on the Lakes and inventory management
could impose exogenous demand cycles on the Railroad Cartel. The speed of the delivery by the JEC
Cartel ensured that if any weekly top ups were necessary in New York to meet demand, the Railroad
Cartel would oblige. The +1 in the expectation of Eq. (2) postulates that it takes one period to ship
the grain via the Lakes from Chicago to New York.
The actual rates for alternative modes of transportation are available from the Aldrich Report. This
can be compared to the expected transportation rate that uses the New York future (delivery within
one month) net of the Chicago spot price, (GRE). Figure 1 (a) to (i) depicts the pattern of weekly
shipment rates between Chicago and New York in each year, including the JEC rates (Porter's GR), the
Great Lakes and Canals rates (GRLC), and GRE. We take the latter to represent the true expected
outside transportation options for the JEC when setting its rate. We notice that GRE shares the same
trends of the JEC rate, GR, and the rate for shipments over the Lakes and Canals, GRLC. Its level is
closer to, but higher than, the Great Lakes and Canal rates as it includes storage costs and the need to
use Railroads. We note that the rate rises at the end of the Lakes open period, a trend that benets
both Railroads and the Steamship companies that operate over the Lakes and Canals. Our expected
outside transportation rate variable highlights the role that inventories (controlled by the Elevators)
had in smoothing rate 
uctuations over the Lakes open and closed seasons. New York did not accept
high Winter transportation costs, but used inventories to benet from the low transportation costs of
the Great Lakes and Canals in the open season. The gures seem to validate our choice of GRE as a
proxy for the rate of the expected outside transportation mode. Table 3 further conrms our choice of
variable, by showing a strong positive correlation between GRE and the rates of alternative modes of
conveyance.
It is interesting to explore whether our expected outside transportation rate, GRE, has a determin-
7Indeed if we had to remove our assumption of prompt delivery for Railroads and one period delivery for Lakes, the
dierence between Chicago and New York would proxy for general transportation costs, i.e. it would also be inclusive of
the rates charged by the JEC Railroad Cartel. Yet, this should not be worrisome, since Coleman unveils that the JEC had
a rather marginal role in the total amount of grain carried to New York via Chicago. Our proxy is also valid when the
Great Lakes are frozen, since competition from non-JEC Railroad Cartel was present as were inventories from the Great
Lakes in New York.
6istic business cycle. We rst look at the rates before the Cartel years (1878-79) in Figures 1(a) and (b).
During Lakes closed the rate increased and then decreased. Such downward revisions on Railroads rates
in the weeks before Lakes opening could re
ect expectations of the Lakes open regime. During Lakes
open the rate decreased up to harvesting then increased as we moved to the closing of the Lakes. The
pressure on the price came from New York trying to build up inventories for the Winter after the harvest
came in. These movements in the expected average transportation rates before the formation of the
JEC suggest to us that the opening and closing of the Lakes had eects on pricing in the weeks running
up to Lakes closing and opening. In addition to controlling for exogenous anticipated movements in the
price of outside transportation options to the JEC, whose movement should in
uence current demand
and pricing (via the ICC inside the cartel), we also control for anticipated exogenous demand cycles - as
motivated by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). This is done by creating two variables that re
ect the
cumulated number of weeks that Lakes have remained open at a given point in time in a year, NWO,
and the countdown on number of weeks until the Lakes re-open at a given point in time in a year, NWC.
NWO starts with a value of one associated with the rst week the Lakes are accessible to navigation,
and reaches its maximum the week prior to Lakes freezing again. The variable is set to zero during Lakes
closed for navigation. As for NWC, it has its maximum the rst week the Lakes are not accessible to
navigation and reduces to a value of one the week before the Lakes reopen to navigation. The variable
is set to zero during Lakes open. Rather than having a simple Lakes open and closed dummy we have
varying degrees of pressures coming from the expectations of Lakes opening and closing represented by
NWC and NWO which exhibit an asymmetric sawtooth prole. The latter represents the pressure to
transport grain to inventories in New York after the harvest to avoid exposure to high transportation
prices during the Winter. The former represents Elevator's increased ability to bargain with the JEC as
the weeks to Lakes opening come nearer. We use these variables to proxy for expectations of increasing
(decreasing) demand as we move along the weeks in the Lakes open (closed) season. Could they just
re
ect week eects in current demand rather than expectations of demand? Maybe, but we will verify,
post-regression, that for the same level of current demand, in either Lakes open or closed, estimated
mark-ups are higher going into a period of growing demand and lower going into a slump.
During (1880-1886) these trends in high and low expected outside transportation rates in both Lakes
closed and open periods outlined above are present, but not in all years. In order to plot our expected
outside transportation rates to a JEC business cycle, we rst create a variable that avails of the Hodrick
and Prescott (1997) lter and estimate the demand business cycles, \ BCQ. We plot the smoothed cycles
against the actual demand in Figure 2. We note that the smoothed cycles indicate that demand for
the JEC was not always higher in Lakes closed periods of each cycle. One might have assumed that
the JEC did more business in the Winter when competition was weak, but inventory management in
New York clearly made demand cycles for the JEC over Lakes open and closed regime more complex,
allowing competition from the Lakes and Canals to have an all year round eect. In four out of the six
Lakes open periods we see shipments increasing as the number of weeks to Lakes closing comes closer
(when prices tended to rise). In most of the Lakes closed periods we see output increasing as the number
of weeks to Lakes open shorten (when price tended to fall). The weeks that did not have such cycles
tended to be when our PR dummy indicated a period of cartel instability. For this reason we plot the
smoothed output cycle against our expected outside transportation rate, GRE, along with NWC and
NWO, in Figure 3.
Overall we feel that we can control for exogenous deterministic cycles that should have an in
uence
on JEC demand and pricing during periods of Cartel stability. We will also examine their role in terms of
Cartel instability, while allowing for an unexpected break in the cycle to play a role here. We do this by
7controlling for unexpected commodity market price movements. Unexpected commodity market shocks
have the ability to change expected demand by Elevators and create a mistake in the calculation of an
expected transportation rate for moving grain between Chicago and New York. We explore whether
such external shocks lead to errors in JEC rate setting which in turn might trigger a period of Cartel
instability.
Elevators determine the optimal demand for transportation based on future commodity prices and
inventory models. Their plan was simple: when the harvest came in there was pressure to build in-
ventories using the cheaper Lakes transportation during the latter half of the Lakes open period. The
inventories could be used even when the Lakes were closed. Anytime inventories fell below a certain
threshold, Elevators urged to top them up as soon as possible. Elevators had the key role of storing
the commodity and providing a hedge against random consumption and harvest shocks. Based on the
information they had available, they solved inter-temporal (dynamic) models to determine the optimal
amount of grain to keep in stock. A by-product of their optimization was the demand for transportation.
We relate the amount of grain available as inventory in Elevators as follows:
Yt = Yt 1 + Mt   Ct; (3)
where Mt is the amount of grain imported in period t (mainly from Chicago) and Ct is period t con-
sumption (mainly the amount of grain shipped to Europe). The volume imported is the result of
transportation by ship and/or train.8 Similarly to Thurman (1988) and Pindyck (1994) we formulate
the cost of holding inventories as the sum of a unit cost for the physical use of Elevators, u, and a function
of current inventories, future expected consumption, and current commodity prices, F (Yt;Et[Ct+T];Zt).
We assume F to be a well behaved function, convex in Y and increasing in C and Z. The negative
of the marginal cost of inventories is the net benet of an extra-unit of inventory, and is known in the
literature as \marginal net convenience yield",9
MNCY (Y ;u)   FY   u; (4)
where the partial derivative of F with respect to the argument Y is assumed negative, FY < 0, and the
cross derivatives FY C and FY Z are assumed to be zero, FY C = FY Z = 0. We sketch the marginal net
convenience yield function in Figure 4.
The presence of future contracts and the no arbitrage condition, due to all protable opportuni-
ties being exploited by an optimal allocation of inventories across time, require the following equality
condition to hold
MNCY (Y E






That is, the dierence between a spot commodity price Zt, and the future commodity price T periods
ahead, Zt+T, discounted for the depreciation commodity rate () and forgone interest rate (r), can be
used to identify the marginal net convenience yield. As documented in Coleman, New York (NY) was by
far the main receiving city from Chicago (C). So, we can use the dierence between a spot and a future
price in New York as a good measure of the (expected) marginal net convenience yield. This will be a
good control for expected demand in New York as perceived by the JEC and its competitors. Without
8Given that Railroads can convey grain within three days, we assume that they are able to provide immediate delivery
(within the week). In addition, we postulate that the alternative modes of transportation meet deliveries within the
following period. In this way Mt casts the sum of transport by Railroads (R) and by Lakes (L) as Mt = MR
t + ML
t 1.
9A term introduced by Working (1949).
8loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we utilize a simplied version of Eq. (5) that assumes  = r = 0:
MNCY E
t  MNCY (Y E







Our next variable captures errors in the expectations of commodity prices in New York. This will be








If Eq. (7) turns out to be negative, the realization of the commodity price in New York at time t, i.e.
a spot price at time t in New York, would turn out to be higher than that expected at time t   1.
Note that the expected future price in New York enters both the marginal net convenience yield and
our proxy for the expected transportation costs. A negative error in expectations at time t goes along
with the two inequalities at time t   1: MNCY E
t 1 > MNCYt 1 and grE
t 1 < gr
t 1. The former sug-
gests that the Elevators have accumulated a level of inventories below the optimal level that they would
have built up under certainty. The Cartel realizes that it has underestimated demand in its price and
quantity setting. The inequality of gr suggests that the Cartel expected the price of its competitors to
be lower than it would have been framed under certainty. We will empirically estimate the impact of
grE and MNCY E on the general run of demand and price setting in the JEC. We would expect the
rate of the outside transportation options to the JEC to come in positive in our model of demand and
optimal price setting. An error in the expectation of the price of the outside option as outlined above
would create a situation that the JEC should have set a higher rate and transported more shipments.
This represents a clear loss in revenue for the Cartel. We will examine whether errors in expectations
in prices of New York commodity markets are factors, among others, that push a higher probability of
instability in the JEC. The analysis above summarizes the data previously used and motivates the use of
the new data that we use to extend the basic structural model in Porter to be outlined in the next section.
3 The model
In this section we rst delineate the model developed by Porter. We then introduce our approach to
modeling and estimation. Like Ellison (1994), our extensions are done to tackle the issue of omitted
variables in demand, to explore the causes of Cartel breakdown and to evaluate the impact of determin-
istic demand cycles on pricing, shipments and stability. Unlike Ellison we use a two-step semiparametric
procedure which is largely motivated by our use of previously omitted data into the system of the model.
More data allows us to have less structure in the estimation of stability, mark-ups (pricing) and demand.
While the results are broadly similar to Ellison in terms of our modeling of stability and demand, we do
nd that the anticipated cyclical nature of demand is important for mark-ups (pricing) during periods
of Cartel stability. Before we outline the model and our extension, we bring attention to the particular
notation that we make use of. From here forward, lower case letters will denote natural logs of their
original variables (i.e., gr will stand for lnGR).
3.1 Porter
Demand Equation
qt = 0[t] + 1grt + 3Lt + U1t; (8)
9where grt is the natural log of the JEC grain rate per bushel shipped in week t, and qt the natural log
of the total quantity of grain shipped by Railroad that week. Lt is a dummy equal to one when the
Great Lakes are open to shipping, and zero otherwise. U1t is a mean zero error term. The parameter
1 is expected to be negative. The parameter 2 is purposely omitted and will be introduced in the
next section, but we can anticipate it is going to be the parameter associated with the expected outside
transportation grain rate. The time-varying coecient 0[t] encompasses a constant and month dummies.
Pricing Equation
Porter estimates the following pricing equation:
grt = 0[t] + 1qt + 2St + 3It + U2t; (9)
where U2t is a mean zero error term generated by errors in marginal costs. This error term and the rst
part of the pricing equation, 0[t] + 1qt + 2St, are assumed to be the linear marginal cost function.
He denotes with St a set of structural dummies that accommodate entry/exit and with 0[t] a constant
augmented with month dummies. The remaining variable, It, is a dummy that equals one during a
collusive regime, and zero otherwise. This is motivated by Green and Porter (1984) to capture a time
varying conduct parameter t. The key assumption is that there are only two regimes: one that is
collusive and one that is reversionary. We will model conduct using a nonparametric function of several
observable variables to capture interesting week to week dynamics in t. This is a key departure from
Porter and Ellison in our modeling of mark-ups. Ellison, when he interacts It with indices of anticipated
cycles, does move a step towards our approach, which is outlined below.
The price-cost margin (PCM) function is given by the ratio   t
1; and can be derived from the equa-
tion: 3It =  ln(1 + t=1). Theory predicts that t is higher during collusive regimes and that we
should expect 3 to be positive, as 1 is expected to be negative. When It is known, using the PO
cheating variable collected by Ulen (1979), Porter estimates Eqs. (8) and (9) using 2SLS. Identication
comes from the fact that there is an explicit functional form, derived in Porter, for marginal costs, and
that there are demand and pricing equations exogenous shifters. When It is unknown, a new variable is
estimated using an endogenous switching (hidden) regime model, as in Lee and Porter (1984).10 This is
the way that Porter constructs his PN binary variable. As outlined in the data section of this paper we
use a PR binary variable, constructed from the Aldrich Report (1893), to re
ect stability or not. This
turns out to be similar to the estimated PN binary variable of Porter and will be shown in the empirical
section to pick up the documented hidden regime in the pricing equation of Porter. Treating PR as data
allows us to employ a two-step estimation procedure to be outlined below.
3.2 Our Extension of Porter
We employ a classic simultaneous equations model for demand and pricing equations. Pricing will be
conditioned on the probability of the Cartel remaining in a collusive or stable regime.
Cartel Stability:
10In this case the demand and pricing equation error terms are assumed to be normally distributed.
10To allow for persistence in regimes, we model Cartel stability as an ARMA(1,1) linear probability model









U3t = Vt 1 + Vt: (10)
In general the JEC sets rates to ensure that the ICC inside the cartel is binding. The results in Porter
are replicated and accepted using our PR variable. PR set to zero represents nite periods of revisions.
The interesting issue relates to what is triggering these revisions. We compete dierent theories against
one another. Each theory provides us with a dierent reason for the ICC to change. If the JEC fails
to adjust its rate optimally these factors can lead to a period of instability. As in Porter (1985) and
Vasconcelos (2004) we account for the number of rms in the Cartel, N; and for the opening and closing
of the Lakes as internal factors that may eect the ICC. We add external controls for the cumulated
number of weeks that Lakes remain open, NWO, and the countdown on number of weeks until the Lakes
re-open, NWC to control for the eect of anticipated deterministic cycles modeled in Haltiwanger and
Harrington (1991). We also include the internal set of triggers, EL, used by Ellison, re
ecting unusual
movements in rm level market shares. Finally, we introduce our new variable that re
ects errors in
expectations of corn prices in New York, Eq. (7). Negative errors in expectations re
ect a situation
where the JEC is likely to have underestimated expected demand and overestimated price competition
from outside transportation modalities. Clearly, the sub-optimal JEC rates can lead to an unstable ICC.
We put forward unexpected commodity market shocks as the key factor that can threaten the Cartel's
stability. The variable Vt denotes a mean zero error term.
Demand Equation:
We extend Porter's demand equation (8) in two ways. First, we expand the set of variables in the linear
structure; most importantly we introduce the price of a substitute transportation mode. Secondly, we
control for expected demand cycles using a nonparametric function. Ellison allows for hidden omitted
variable regimes in demand and serial correlation in the demand residuals. We address this issues by
including new control variables and add a lagged dependent variable in demand to allow for partial
adjustments. The latter is done as a robustness test on our estimation results. The baseline demand
equation that we estimate is:
qt = 0[t] + 1grt + 2grE







Equation (11) depends on the own grain transportation rate, grt, and on the expected rate of the out-
side transportation rates, grE
t . Lt is a dummy equal to one when the Great Lakes are open to shipping,
and zero otherwise. U1t is a mean zero error term. Here the parameter 0[t] includes a constant, month
dummies and also year dummies. To control for expected deterministic demand cycles, not captured
by our price variables, we also include the variables number of weeks to Lakes opening and Lakes open,
NWC and NWO respectively, and the (expected) marginal net convenience yield (inventory stocks in
New York), MNCY , in an unspecied 
1 function. We employ a semiparametric estimation set out in
Appendix A and this will be done simultaneously with the pricing equation that we outline below.
Pricing Equation:
We enrich Porter's pricing equation (9) in two ways. First we include new variables. A second clear
11point of departure is the absence of It, a dummy that equals one during a collusive regime, and zero
otherwise. This is replaced with a 
2 function that will allow us back-out week to week dynamics in t
for a given set of demand primitives:







Having an estimate of 
2() we can back-out the price-cost margin,  t
 , from the relation 
2t =
 ln(1+t=), where  is the total market elasticity,   1+2. In other words, we model Porter's un-
observable It with observables in a nonparametric form, 
2 (), and not as a hidden binary regime. The
observables used control for expected exogenous pricing cycles from external competition, grE, NWC,
NWO and for the predicted probability of Cartel stability r weeks ahead, ^ PRt+r. We believe the latter
is a good approximation to the way that Gallet and Schroeter (1995) empirically relate the mark-up at
time t to the discounted expected value of future JEC collusive prots. We control for the eect on the
mark-up of movements in expected future demand, as motivated by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991),
through NWC and NWO. We use NWC and NWO to proxy for expectations of demand. 11
The unspecied function 
2 () is aimed at catching the mark-up part of the pricing equation. We
do not make any parametric assumption on 
2 () but rather exploit the data and model 
2 () nonpara-
metrically. We include in the function all those variables that we think can aect directly, and interact
with the other variables, to drive the mark-up. As in Porter, once we specify marginal costs as the sum
of the error term and 0[t] + 1qt + 2St, the deterministic residual becomes a function of the mark-up.
One disadvantage with this approach is that some of the controls for marginal cost could clearly be part
of the mark-up. Hence we have to be careful about the interpretation of the level of the mark-up.
4 Results
Porter's Hidden Regime:
The 2SLS and ML columns 1-4 of Table 4 reproduce the results of Porter's Table 3. Columns 5-8
repeat the estimations, but replace his variable PO with our observed cheating variable, PR, constructed
from the Aldrich Report. The main aim of this exercise is to see whether PR estimates the incidence of
cheating similarly to the variable PN, endogenously estimated in Porter. Table 4 suggests that the use
of PO or PR in general produces comparable results. There are dierences worth mentioning however.
The employment of PR, instead of PO, raises the R2 in the pricing equation from 0:32 in column 2 to
0:67 in column 6, for the 2SLS results. This is lower than 0:78 in column 4 when the hidden regime is
endogenously estimated using PO as the original variable. The same ML estimator can increase the R2
to 0:85 in column 8 when using PR as the initial variable. The subsequent columns 9-16 are a rerun of
the estimations in columns 1-8, with the addition of year dummies as controls in the demand equation.
We see that controlling for year dummies in demand strengthens the explanatory power of the demand
side. We run an independent two-sample Student's t-test and nd that controlling for year dummies
makes the estimated coecients on the cheating dummy in the 2SLS estimators statistically dierent
from one another, at the 5 per cent signicance level. Also, the same test highlights a signicant dif-
ference at the 1 per cent level in the estimated coecients on the cheating dummy of the ML(PN) and
11We capture exogenous movements in current demand using the price grE, while month (and when applicable year)
dummies and endogenous movements in current demand are accounted for through cost. NWC and NWO may just re
ect
week eects in current demand but the controls are consistent with and do control for the eects of expected demand.
122SLS(PR) estimators, inclusive or not of year dummies in demand. No signicant dierence is found for
the estimated price elasticity variable. Hence the estimated level of price-cost margin may dier across
specications that originally use PN or PR. Yet, when we compare columns 11 and 12 (Porter's PN)
to columns 13 and 14, our 2SLS estimates using PR performs just as well. There will only be slight
dierences in the incidence of price wars. In Table 1 we report basic summary statistics for PO, PN,
PR and PRN. While PO is very dierent from the others, PN, PR and PRN are very similar. Hence,
our use of PR and inclusion of year dummies in the demand equation does not change the key Porter
result. There is a hidden regime in the pricing equation that is clearly linked to the \price wars" that
occurred intermittently in this Cartel. Therefore when we estimate our demand and pricing equations
we need to condition on being in a regime of Cartel stability or not as dened by PR.
Causes of Cartel Instability:
The rst four columns of Table 5 model our PR variable, which identies periods of Cartel stability.
We estimate the linear probability model with the ARMA (1,1) specication introduced in Eq. (10). The
estimations highlight a strong persistence in the state of the dependent variable, as indicated by the high
value of the  parameter. Once a shock brings the dependent variable from a state of stability to one of
instability, it may take a certain number of weeks before it goes back to stability. The span of instability
is embedded on the intensity of the shock that has caused the drifting away, and on realizations of other
opposite (in sign) future shocks.
Another key variable that turns out signicant in explaining Cartel stability is the error in expecta-
tions of the commodity price in New York introduced in Eq. (7). If the error pans out to be negative,
then the spot price at time t in New York would prove to be higher than that expected at time t 1. We
have discussed earlier how that relates to the expected marginal net convenience yield and the expected
outside transportation rate. Elevators will nd out that inventories were below the optimal level and
transportation companies will realize that freight rates could have been expected to be higher. The JEC
will underestimate demand and formulate an expected rate of its competitors to be lower than it would
have framed under certainty. In theory the JEC should have set a higher rate and transported more
shipments to sustain the ICC constraint. This represents a clear mistake and potential loss in revenue
for the Cartel and creates a higher probability of instability in the JEC. We nd clear evidence that
unexpected demand shocks in corn markets in New York triggered instability in the JEC. This is con-
sistent with Green and Porter (1984) and is similar to a nding in Ellison (1994), who worked with the
random part of the demand residual to model unexpected demand shocks. We have gone a step further
and linked it to errors in expectations of corn market prices in New York. Anticipated demand cycles,
the cumulated number of weeks that Lakes remain open, NWO, and the countdown on number of weeks
until the Lakes re-open, NWC, which control for the eect of anticipated deterministic cycles modeled
in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), are insignicant. This is also consistent with the ndings of
Ellison who used dierent endogenous indices to control for expected demand using the autocorrelated
demand residuals, among other components. The same important result, that demand shocks and not
anticipated cycles were the key drivers of Cartel instability, emerges. This supports the theory of Green
and Porter (1984).
As in Porter (1985) and Vasconcelos (2004) we account for the number of rms in the Cartel, N; and
for the opening and closing of the Lakes as factors eecting the ICC constraint. In contrast to them, the
number of rms is never signicant in our model, while the probability of Cartel instability is more likely
to happen in the Lakes open regime. A feature of the Lakes open regime is that demand tends to be low
for the JEC up to the harvesting and then increases rapidly up to Lakes closing. We will see that prots
for the JEC, which we estimate post-regression analysis, were \normally" highest in the latest weeks of
13Lakes open, when prices and shipments both increased. Errors in expectations about demand in this
period, in particular setting price and shipments below the optimal level, would be very problematic for
the Cartel. Finally, we include the set of triggers, EL, used in Ellison, and nd as he did that unusual
movements in market shares inside the JEC were not as important as the common external demand
shocks that came from New York which all rms faced.
Estimating Mark-Ups and Prots:
We estimate mark-up and prot dynamics for the JEC using a classic simultaneous equations model
for demand and pricing equations. Pricing will be conditioned on the probability of the Cartel remaining
in a collusive, or stable, regime. We utilize the specication displayed in column 4 of Table 5 to compute
the predicted probability of Cartel stability ^ PRt+1, which we incorporate in our modeling of 
2() in
the regressions documented in Table 6.
In the 2SLS columns for the baseline model in Table 6, we linearize the 
2() function in the pricing
equation, and the 
1() function in the demand equation. We can think of this as a polynomial of order
one in the variables that enter the two functions. It has the advantage that it simplies the estimator
to a 2SLS approach which, given the use of year dummies, can be compared to the results documented
in columns 13-14 in Table 4. We can judge whether these new control variables have interesting partial
eects in terms of sign, magnitude and signicance. The down side is that we are missing out on po-
tentially interesting interactions between the variables in these functions. For example, our controls for
deterministic cycles in 
2(), which are: grE, NWC and NWO could impact JEC rate setting very
dierently when interacted with the predicted probability of Cartel stability, ^ PRt+1. Hence we also
estimate and document the results of using a semiparametric GMM estimation for this baseline model.
We now discuss the results for the baseline model. Our variable, grE, that controls for the expected
price on alternative modes of transportation, comes in signicant in demand. An increase in the grain
rate of the alternative modes of transportation increases demand for shipments by Cartel. This is an
important result as it will drive, along with the JEC grain rate, the total market elasticity,   1 +2,
which we need for calculating our price-cost margin. The variables in our 
1(), that control for an-
ticipated demand, such as the (expected) marginal net convenience yield, MNCY E, for inventories in
New York, are not signicant as independent partial eects. The prices are doing all the work in the
equation.
In the pricing equation, all our new variables in 
2() come in signicant. All things equal, the
accumulation of weeks to Lakes closing, NWO, puts an upward pressure on pricing and the loss of
weeks to Lakes opening puts a downward pressure on prices, NWC. The expected price of the outside
transportation options, grE, creates an upward pressure on price. We see the JEC as a price follower
in this optimal response function. The estimated probability of stability, ^ PRt+1, comes in signicant
and has important upward pressure on pricing. The linearized 
2() function can be backed out. There
is no real change in the sign and signicance of the other variables, except for output in pricing being
positive and signicant. The overall explanatory power of the supply side model is now higher, giving
us increased condence in our attempts to estimate the 
2() function.
This baseline model is also estimated using a semiparametric GMM estimation method to allow 
2()
in pricing and the 
1() in demand to be estimated nonparametrically. We adjust the Robinson (1988)
Dierence Estimator in order to account for the endogeneity in the system of simultaneous equations
(see Appendix A for details on the estimator). The results from the semiparametric estimation for
the baseline model are presented in the semiparametric columns of Table 6. The sum of the own- and
cross-price elasticities are now estimated to be lower. The 
2() function is computed to be a bigger
deterministic component as the overall explanatory power of the supply side model has increased from
140.68 to 0.85, due to implicit interactions between the variables in the 
2() function.
Ellison allows for serial correlation in the demand equation. To improve the overall explanatory power
of the demand equation and get better estimates of price elasticities we model demand as a partial ad-
justment model. The structure in the demand equation suggests that we do not control for dierences in
actual rates (which change daily) and the ocial rate (set weekly) well enough and we should allow for
a one week partial adjustment. Our results for this model using a 2SLS estimator of our linear modeling
are presented in columns 5-6, and its semiparametric estimation is presented in columns 7-8, of Table
6. The parameters and standard errors have to be divided by (1   ^ [qt 1]) to be comparable to those
of the baseline model. The explanatory power of the demand model is now 0.74. More importantly, we
see that the sum of the \adjusted" own- and cross-price elasticities are higher when compared to the
baseline model. Hence, our estimated mark-ups will be aected by the lagged dependent variable on
the demand side. There are some changes on the pricing side. The linear modeling of 
2() shows the
expected outside transportation rate has a bigger and more signicant eect. The estimated cheating
probability has a smaller coecient. Output in marginal cost is showing some economies of scale. Unlike
the earlier literature, having controlled eectively for the omitted variables and partial adjustment, we
now observe economies of scale in marginal costs.12 While Fabra (2006) shows us that the results of
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) would be less likely to hold in industries with capacity constraints,
economies of scale theoretically reinforce the mechanisms in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991).13 The
explanatory power of the pricing equation increases further to 0.87 when estimated semiparametrically.
Our 
2() term will be estimated to be slightly dierent in the presence our partial adjustment model.
Our estimated mark-up dynamics are calculated using the estimated 
2() in the pricing equation
and  in demand equation from the four models documented in Table 6. The top four graphs of Figure
5 are plots of the estimated price-cost margin,  
^ t
^  , overlapped by their smoothed cycles, constructed
from our four structural models of equilibrium pricing and demand. The estimates of the price-cost
margin are plotted over the Lakes opening and closing periods, and against periods of Cartel instability
as dened by our PR=0 variable.14 The bottom four graphs are the corresponding plots of estimated
prot (overlapped by their smoothed cycles), constructed from our four structural models.15
The estimated cycles from our four models in Table 6 are reasonably similar in trends but dier in
levels. Clearly, the weeks of Cartel instability are associated with unusually low mark-ups and prots for
the Cartel. Railroads made losses over some spells when PR was zero. Our semiparametric estimation
of the partial adjustment model of demand with supply would suggest that the Cartel actually incurred
sustained losses during these periods. In periods of stability we do see some interesting \stylized" cycles
emerging. In Lakes closed regimes we see price-cost margins drop as Lakes opening approaches. While
mark-ups are low at the start of Lakes open they consistently rise over the period. More importantly,
looking at prot cycles, the periods coming to the end of Lakes open normally generated the highest
weekly prots for the Cartel. The race against the clock in inventory management normally induced
increases on the outside transportation rates (captured by grE), hence the volume of trade and the
grain rate for the Cartel can both increase. Given that the JEC had higher monopolistic power during
the Lakes closed regime, it is interesting to see prots peaking at the end of the Lakes open periods.
12Walters (1967) has surveyed estimates of cost function in 34 industries, and found evidence of constant or increasing
returns to scale.
13When demand is expected to be high, then marginal costs are expected to be low. A threat of a revision to a zero
prot becomes more binding as expected demand rises, and less binding as expected demand falls.
14Sub-gures 5(a) through (d) have been set on to share the same constant. That is, from the correspondent semi-
parametric estimation of ^ 
2() we have subtracted the constant computed in the linearized semiparametric case (2SLS
estimation).
15Cartel prot is computed as mark-up times quantity and is expressed in tens of thousands of dollars.
15This highlights the role and the need to have data on the external pressures that come from inventory
management in New York and pricing over the Lakes and Canals on the JEC.
Cyclical Nature of Mark-Ups:
A core contribution of this paper is to provide evidence of cyclical mark-ups over our documented
deterministic demand cycles. We represent the smoothed price-cost margin and prot cycles against
normalized output cycles in Figure 6. Can we see obvious counter or pro-cyclical movements of mark-
ups with output? What emerges is that during periods of Cartel stability we see four Lakes open episodes
where output and price-cost margin move up together as we move towards Lakes closing. This generates
rising prots that peak just before the Lakes close. We also see that during periods of Cartel stability
we have ve Lakes closed episodes, where output is rising but price-cost margins are falling as we move
closer to Lakes opening. Periods of instability are less clear-cut but look counter-cyclical. As Ellison
points out, we are not asking the right question here. What we should be asking is whether our estimated
mark-ups are supportive of the mechanisms in the theory of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). To test
their theory during the collusive periods, we regress price-cost margins during upswings and price-cost
margins during downturns on the number of rms and a quartic function of the demand business cycle.
The results from the regression are plotted in Figure 7.16 The Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) theory
seems to be validated: for the same level of demand, the price (mark-up) is lower when the JEC is in
a period of prolonged decline in demand, compared to coming into a period of prolonged increases in
demand. This is powerful evidence that during periods of stability the JEC did price optimally over
deterministic demand cycles creating interesting dynamics in mark-ups that reiterate those found in
Borenstein and Shepard (1996). This is strong evidence that pricing in cartels react in a predictable way
to anticipated seasonal cycles.
5 Conclusions
The use of theory and data from Coleman (2009) allows us to control for the expected rate of transporta-
tion in alternative modalities and unexpected commodity price shocks in New York. These variables
have a tremendous impact on the modeling of price and quantity movements in the JEC. Analysis of
the JEC data, without controlling for the transportation rates of grain over the Great Lakes and Canals
from the dominant competitor, was always going to be problematic. We nd that these additional vari-
ables were necessary to model demand primitives. The industry elasticity of demand is made up of an
important cross-price, as well as an own-price, eect. These demand primitives are needed to construct
the mark-up from the estimated nonparametric deterministic component (pricing over marginal cost)
in the pricing equation. In addition, the expected price of transportation outside the JEC, because of
harvesting and inventory management over the Great Lakes and Canals, has distinctive deterministic
demand cycles for the Railroad Cartel to set prices against. In modeling pricing above our marginal
cost nonparametrically, we nd evidence that such external deterministic demand cycles do matter, in
addition to an expected probability of Cartel stability. The latter is found to be triggered by unexpected
commodity price shocks in New York rather than deterministic demand cycles. This is consistent with
cartel breakdowns as modeled in Green and Porter (1984). We estimate the equilibrium price path
semiparametrically, simultaneously to demand, and conditioned on the estimated expectation of cartel
16The spikes in the gures are due to the number of rms varying from three to ve during the period. We have no
spikes when there are four rms, we have decreasing spikes when we have ve rms, and increasing spikes in case of three
rms.
16stability. Linear estimates of the parameters of marginal cost allow us to back-out the nonparametric
function and, using our demand primitives, get our weekly estimates of the price-cost margin for the
JEC.
Our controls for external deterministic demand cycles, lead us to estimate rich weekly mark-ups and
prots cycles during periods of Cartel stability. For the same volume of sales, the mark-up in a prolonged
boom (later weeks of Lakes open) tends to increase when compared to the mark-up coming into a pro-
longed recession (later weeks of Lakes closed). We nd the JEC set prices over demand cycles in a way
that supports the theoretical considerations in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). As highlighted in
Borenstein and Shepard (1996), such cyclical pricing may be a way of detecting illegal pricing behavior
in a modern day cartel.
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19Table 1: Summary Statistics (Variables in alphabetical order)
Variable name Denition Obs. Mean sd Min. Max.
PORTER
GR The ocial grain rate, in dollars per 100 lbs. 328 0.246 0.067 0.125 0.400
L Lakes dummy, reported as one when Lakes are
open, zero otherwise.
328 0.573 0.495 0 1
PO Cheating dummy as reported in the Railway
Review and Chicago Tribune.
328 0.619 0.486 0 1
PN Estimated cheating dummy. 328 0.750 0.434 0 1
Q Total quantity of grain shipped, in tons. 328 25,384 11,632 4,810 76,407
S1
Dummy equal one from week 28 in 1880 to
week 10 in 1883, zero otherwise. This period
re
ects the opening of a new line by Grand
Trunk Railway.
328 0.424 0.495 0 1
S2
Dummy equal one from week 11 in 1883 to
week 25 in 1883, zero otherwise. This period
re
ects the opening of a new line by New York
Central.
328 0.046 0.209 0 1
S3
Dummy equal one from week 26 in 1883 to
week 11 in 1886, zero otherwise. This period
re
ects the entry of Chicago and Atlantic Rail-
ways.
328 0.433 0.496 0 1
S4
Dummy equal one from week 12 in 1886 to
week 16 in 1886, zero otherwise. This period
re
ects the departure of Chicago and Atlantic
Railways.
328 0.015 0.123 0 1
ELLISONy
N Number of rms (railroads) 328 4.351 0.627 3 5
BIG1 Unusually high market share of one rm 327 1.072 0.548 0.130 3.156
(measure 1). [1.091] [0.569] [0.040] [2.971]
BIG2 Unusually high market share of one rm 327 1.141 0.680 0.169 3.975
(measure 2). [1.241] [0.710] [0.185] [4.235]
BIGQ Unusually high market share of one rm 327 1.971 0.945 -0.148 4.888
(measure 3). [1.174] [0.516] [0.158] [2.973]
SMALL1 Unusually small market share of one rm. 327 1.139 0.700 0 6.116
[1.230] [0.737] [0.116] [5.757]
y In square bracket the values computed by Ellison. Due to a dierent way of averaging over the rst twelve weeks,
our reproduction of Ellison's variables is slightly o from the original.
20Table 1: Summary Statistics (Cont.)
Variable name Denition Obs. Mean sd Min Max
OUR CONSTRUCTED VARIABLES
\ BCQ
Estimated Output Business Cycle (estimated
using Hodrick and Prescott's (1997) lter).
328 25,384 6,973 10,517 41,485
ER
Error in expectations. Recovered from the dif-
ference between GP0N lagged one period and
GPN.
320 -0.008 0.058 -0.393 0.554
GPC Chicago spot (call) corn prices (New York
Times):y
328 0.889 0.209 0.603 1.482
GP1C Chicago future corn prices for delivery next
month (next 4 weeks), New York Times:y
328 0.880 0.202 0.594 1.424
GPN New York spot (call) corn prices (New York
Times):y
328 1.105 0.187 0.817 1.946
GP0N New York future corn prices for delivery within
the month (New York Times):y
320 1.097 0.186 0.815 1.964
GP1N New York future corn prices for delivery next
month (next 4 weeks), (New York Times):y
328 1.084 0.178 0.817 1.572
GP2N New York future corn prices for delivery in two
months (in 8 weeks), (New York Times):y
328 1.082 0.180 0.817 1.574
GR Proxy for transportation rates of competitors
 (GP0N   GPC).
320 0.208 0.085 0.010 0.750
GRAll
Grain rate of transport by All Railroads in dol-
lars per 100 lbs (Aldridge's report). Available
for the period 1878-91.
328 0.254 0.059 0.140 0.400
GRLC
Grain rate of transport by Lakes and Canals in
dollars per 100 lbs (Aldridge's report). Avail-
able for the period 1878-83.
138 0.153 0.046 0.063 0.288
GRLR
Grain rate of transport by Lakes and Rail-
roads in dollars per 100 lbs (Aldridge's report).
Available for the period 1878-91.
190 0.185 0.044 0.110 0.295
LC Lakes and Canals dummy, reported one when
GRLC > 0, zero otherwise.
138 0.421 0.494 0 1
LR Lakes and Railroads dummy, reported one
when GRLR > 0, zero otherwise.
190 0.579 0.494 0 1
MNCYE Proxy for (expected) Marginal Net Conve-
nience Yield  (GPN   GP0N).
320 0.010 0.020 -0.045 0.123
NWC Yearly de-cumulative Number of Weeks to the
opening of Lakes (zero when open).
328 4.159 6.282 0 23
NWO Yearly cumulative Number of Weeks the Lakes
remain Open (zero when closed).
328 9.311 10.636 0 34
PR
A dummy equal one if the JEC grain rate was
equal to the Chicago-New York grain rate that
Railroads, including the JEC, tried to peg to;
zero otherwise (Aldridge's report).
328 0.765 0.424 0 1
PRN Estimated PR dummy. 328 0.759 0.428 0 1
y Weekly average of daily prices, where a daily price is the average of the minimum and maximum price of the day.
21Table 2: Number of Weeks Lakes Open L, Lakes and Railroads Open LR, Lakes and Canals Open LC.
Number of Weeks of Collusion based on PO and PR
Year N. Weeks L LR LC PO PN PR PRN
1880 52 34 33 33 52 52 51 52
1881 52 28 29 26 15 26 26 26
1882 52 33 35 32 48 41 40 41
1883 52 33 31 27 47 52 49 52
1884 52 31 32 . 22 33 26 33
1885 52 29 30 . 12 26 24 29
1886 16 0 0 . 7 16 15 16
Tot. 328 188 190 118 203 246 251 249
Table 3: Correlations
GR GRLC GRLR GR
GR 1.00 (328)
GRLC 0.65y (138) 1.00 (138)
GRLR 0.79y (190) 0.86y (137) 1.00 (190)
GR 0.65y (320) 0.81y (135) 0.62y (187) 1.00 (320)
In bracket number of observations.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 5: ARMA (1,1) Cartel stability estimations
VARIABLES PR (=1 Collusion)
C 1.605 1.587 1.662 1.714
(2.979) (2.969) (3.019) (3.019)
Nt 1 -0.054 -0.057 -0.045 -0.053
(0.076) (0.076) (0.073) (0.077)
Lt 1 -0.308* -0.302 -0.311* -0.317*
(0.185) (0.188) (0.186) (0.181)
NWOt 1 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
NWCt 1 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ERt 1 0.561*** 0.571*** 0.569*** 0.564***









PRt 1 0.791*** 0.788*** 0.787*** 0.797***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051)
Vt 1 0.045 0.047 0.049 0.026
(0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.068)
Month Dummies NO NO NO NO
Year Dummies NO NO NO NO
Obs. 318 318 318 318
R2 316/318 316/318 316/318 316/318
Obs: ^ PR < 0 1/318 1/318 1/318 1/318
Obs: ^ PR > 1 52/318 49/318 50/318 59/318
ll -10.305 -9.725 -10.420 -8.478
Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We employ an optimization method that switches between the BHHH
and the BFGS algorithm.
24Table 6: Estimations
Baseline Model Partial Adjustment Modely
Linear 2SLS Semiparametric GMM Linear 2SLS Semiparametric GMM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
VARIABLES q gr q gr q gr q gr
C 8.493*** -2.477*** 2.898*** -1.132***
(0.421) (0.502) (0.465) (0.330)
Lt -0.582*** 0.119 -0.284*** 0.149
(0.122) (0.457) (0.093) (0.345)
NWCt -0.013 0.023*** -0.005 0.022***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
NWOt 0.012 0.018*** 0.013* 0.016***




grt -1.094*** -0.774*** -0.572*** -0.426**
(0.195) (0.184) (0.160) (0.166)
grE
t 0.120** 0.095* 0.092* 0.089** 0.107*** 0.072*
(0.059) (0.052) (0.051) (0.044) (0.023) (0.038)
qt 0.079* 0.051 -0.049* -0.045
(0.047) (0.043) (0.029) (0.033)
qt 1 0.632*** 0.603***
(0.049) (0.063)
^ PRt+1 0.439*** 0.396***
(0.036) (0.032)
S1t -0.228*** 0.005 -0.227*** 0.005
(0.042) (0.022) (0.040) (0.020)
S2t -0.143** 0.065** -0.144*** 0.064**
(0.057) (0.029) (0.054) (0.029)
S3t -0.374*** -0.053** -0.345*** -0.030
(0.045) (0.023) (0.042) (0.020)
S4t -0.254** 0.082 -0.331*** 0.017
(0.098) (0.056) (0.091) (0.044)
Month Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Obs. 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311
R2 0.510 0.680 0.561 0.849 0.738 0.711 0.743 0.872
Standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
y Coecients and standard errors have to be divided by 1 
1 ^ qt 1
 to be comparable to those of the baseline model,
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Figure 1: Modes of transportation rates: Lakes and Canals (GRLC ), JEC Railroads (GR +),
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Figure 2: Quantity (     ) and estimated quantity business cycles (|). The signs at 0 denote Cartel
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Figure 3: Estimated quantity business cycles (bold font      ), Number of weeks Lakes open/closed
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Figure 5: Estimated price-cost margin and prot (     ), and estimated price-cost margin and prot
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Figure 6: Normalized quantity business cycles (     ), and estimated price-cost margin and prot
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Figure 7: Estimated price-cost margin booms (|) and price-cost margin recessions (   ) by quantity
business cycle and number of rms
31A Econometrics












































The terms C1[t] and C2[t] are in bold font and have time subscripts in square brackets as they include,
month and year dummies, the former, and only month dummies, the latter. The constant is omitted both
from XL
1t and XL
2t as it cannot be identied separately from the unknown nonparametric functions 
1 ()
and 
2 (). Also, the variable Et(PRt+1) being unobserved at time t, we replace it with its predicted
value ^ PRt+1, which is a one period lead of the estimated ARMA(1;1) latent specication
PRt = PRt 1 + XL
3;t 1
 + U3t




The estimated value of Equation (15) is
^ PRt = ^ PRt 1 + XL
3;t 1^ 
 + ^ ^ Vt 1; (16)
and its one-period lead is
^ PRt+1 = ^ PRt + XL
3t^ 
 + ^ ^ Vt: (17)
The system of equations (13) is on the whole identied via exogenous demand shifters (a Lakes open/closed
dummy, year dummies that account for years of abundant/scarce crop and marginal net convenience yield
to explain spikes in demand) and cost shifters (structural dummies). However, given that Et(PRt+1)
is a term of XNL
2t we need to investigate the identication, further. Prior to providing any additional
discussion on this matter, we recall that the unobserved Et(PRt+1) is replaced by the predicted value
^ PRt+1. With such a formulation we hope that a one-period lead of the estimated PR series, ^ PR, displays
less correlation with the U2 series, than does the original PR series. In addition, the series is expected
to exhibit no correlation or, if any, a minimal correlation, with the demand error term, U1. With this in
mind, we add ^ PRt+1 to the cost shifters and better identify the grain rate endogenous variable, gr.
We now generalize the above notation and denote with G the total number of equations, and with g
one of these equations. Part of the notation that follows is inherited from Wooldridge (2002). For each
equation g we assume that we have a set of instruments that satises the following condition
E (UgjZg) = 0; g = 1;;G: (18)















































So that we have
yt = XL







We employ the Robinson (1988) dierence estimator to estimate Eq. (20). We take the expectation of
Eq. (20) conditional on XNL
















 + Ut; (21)
where we made use of the assumption E(UtjXNL
t ) = 0.

















, Eq. (21) simplies to
~ yt = ~ XL
t  + Ut: (22)
Given the matrix XL
t includes endogenous variables, one needs to deal with the endogeneity in a semi-
parametric framework. As previously mentioned, we postulate that we have a set of instruments that




















Next, we adjust the Robinson (1988) dierence estimator to deal with the endogeneity. So, we pre-
multiply both sides of equation (22) by the transpose of the matrix of instruments, Zt; and get
Z0
t~ yt = Z0
t ~ XL












are unknown, ~ yt and ~ XL
t are themselves unknown. We
























. Now, if we dene ^ ~ yt 
h

















Equation (25) reduces to
Z0




t  + Z0
tUt: (26)
17For the continuous variables (q, q 1, gr, gr), we employ the Hurvich, Simono, and Tsai (1998) Kullback-Leibler
Cross-Validation method, implemented in the function npregbw, to select the bandwidth for the multivariate Kernel
regression npreg. For the dichotomous variables (month, year, Lakes and structural dummies), we utilize the Klein and
Spady (1993) Single Index Model methodology, built in the function npindexbw, to pick the bandwidth for the regression
npindex. The covariates retained for the demand and pricing equations are, respectively, XNL
1 and XNL
2 . Refer to Li and
Racine (2007) for details on the nonparametric regression theory.
33We now employ a GMM estimator with an optimal weighting matrix and estimate the linear parameters




 1 Z0 ^ ~ X
i 1 ^ ~ X0Z(Z0Z)
 1 Z0^ ~ y; (27)




















We use the estimated parameters ^ 2SLS to compute the residuals, as these are necessary for the con-










The GMM estimator is
^ GMM =
h
^ ~ X0Z ^ WZ0 ^ ~ X
i 1 ^ ~ X
0
Z ^ WZ0^ ~ y; (30)




















At last, the nonlinear component ^ 

















 ^ GMM: (32)
34